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The prevailing view in the law and economics literature has long been that preventing ﬁrms and
consumers from contracting out of mandatory product liability rules can only be justiﬁed if con-
sumers are, in some way, irrational or misperceive the risks of the products they buy. In this
paper, I take the contrary view that even if consumers do correctly judge the risks of the products
they buy, if they cannot directly observe the safety characteristics of the products they buy, then
allowing ﬁrms and consumers to write their own liability rules cannot lead ﬁrms to make eﬃcient
investments in product safety (unless the eﬃcient level of investment is zero). Because the legal
system is costly, consumers always have an incentive to waive liability in exchange for a lower price
after safety investments are sunk. If they do so, however, ﬁrms will anticipate this, thereby under-
mining there incentive to invest in safety. Only mandatory product liability provides a mechanism
for consumers and ﬁrms to commit not waive liability.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art471I n t r o d u c t i o n
The prevailing view in the law and economics literature has long been that preventing ﬁrms and
consumers from contracting out of mandatory product liability rules can only be justiﬁed if con-
sumers are, in some way, irrational or misperceive the risks of the products they buy. As Spence
(1977) put it, ”The mere fact that products may fail or cause accidents is not by itself an argument
for intervention in the market. But, because of the random character of the outcome, there is a
suspicion that consumers are not accurately informed about the distribution of possible outcomes
prior to purchase.” This view has been echoed in many subsequent economic analyses of product
liability (see, for example, Shavell (2003) and Geistfeld (1995)). In fact, this view has led many
commentators to argue that mandatory product liability should be eliminated or curtailed in favor
of contratually-based liability (Rubin 1999; Priest 1992; Huber 1988). Furthermore, many states
have enacted statutes that limited consumers ability to recover for product-caused injuries, forcing
them to rely more on contractual remedies for such losses (Geistfeld 1994).
In this paper, I take the contrary view that even if consumers do correctly judge the risks of the
products they buy, if they cannot directly observe the safety characteristics of the products they
buy, then allowing ﬁrms and consumers to write their own liability rules cannot lead ﬁrms to make
eﬃcient investments in product safety (unless the eﬃcient level of investment is zero). What drives
this result is, paradoxically, the ineﬃciency of the legal system. Imagine that there are two ways
to make a water heater, the unsafe way and the safer way. Naturally, the safer way costs more
than the unsafe way. Furthermore, assume that a consumer purchasing the water heater cannot
observe whether the ﬁrm used the unsafe or the safer way. Thus, if the ﬁrm is not liable for water
heater accidents, it has no incentive to use the more costly, but safer, manufacturing process. One
might think that if the cost making the water heater safer is less than the beneﬁt from the increased
safety (a lower accident probability), that ﬁrms and consumers would write a contract that holds
the ﬁrm liable for accidents. If using the tort system to provide consumers with insurance against
injuries is more costly than purchasing ﬁrst party insurance directly, however, this cannot always
be the case. To see this, imagine that when ﬁrms are choosing their manufacturing process, they
assume their contract with consumers will hold them liable for injuries. As a result, they use
the safer, but more costly method. At the time a consumer is buying a water heater, however,
the manufacturing process has already been chosen. If, in equilibrium, ﬁr m sa l w a y su s et h es a f e r
method, the consumer can oﬀer to waive liability and purchase the water heater at a lower price
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have money left over. But, since this is the optimal strategy for the consumer, the ﬁrm would
anticipate that it would not be held liable. Thus, it would have no incentive to use the safer
method.
This result is a variation of Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1990) result that renegotiation undermines
second best agency contracts. In that model, the agent’s wage must vary with output to induce
the agent to work hard. The cost of such a contract is that it exposes the risk averse agent to risk.
But, if the principal and the agent can renegotiate after the agent has chosen her eﬀort level, then
both sides can be made better oﬀ if the principal (who is risk neutral) replaces the agent’s incentive
contract with a ﬂat wage. Since the agent’s eﬀort level is now ﬁxed, there are no incentive costs,
only risk-sharing beneﬁts. But, if the agent anticipates this renegotiation will take place, she has
no incentive to work hard in the ﬁrst place.1
In my model, risk is not an issue since the consumer can purchase ﬁrst party insurance, so, I
assume for simplicity, that the consumer and ﬁrm are risk neutral. Instead, the cost of the legal
system plays the role that risk aversion plays in the standard agency model; it is what makes the
optimal incentive contract ex post ineﬃcient. Thus, as in Fudenberg and Tirole’s model, the only
way to sustain an ex post ineﬃcient incentive contract is if there is also some ex post asymmetric
information. That is, the ﬁrm can not make product safer with probability one. Instead, even
if the beneﬁts of safety exceed the cost, there is a maximum probability that the ﬁrm can make
the product safer. The reason is that if the likelihood that the product is safer is too high, the
consumer prefers to oﬀer a contract that waives liability in exchange for a lower price that both
a ﬁrm that makes a safer and an unsafe product prefer to the full liability contract. But, again,
if the consumer does so, then the ﬁrm has no incentive to make the product safer. As in agency
model, the problem is lack of commitment. Both parties would be better oﬀ if they could commit
ex ante not to waive liability, but under contractually-based liability, such a commitment is not
possible. Mandatory liability provides such a commitment.
Of course, this only establishes that contractually-based liability has an important disadvantage
relative to mandatory liability—it cannot induce the ﬁrm to make costly and unobservable safety
1It should be noted that Fudenberg and Tirole’s result depends on the principal making the renegotiation oﬀer.
Ma (1994) did show that if the agent, rather than the principal, makes the renegotiation oﬀer, then it is possible
to sustain the second best outcome with renegotiation. Wickelgren (2003), however, shows that if both parties can
make renegotiation oﬀers, then the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) result is restored. A similar caveat applies to the
results here; they are valid so long as the consumer has the opportunity to propose waiving liability, even if the ﬁrm
can also propose a liability contract.
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that prevents the harmful eﬀects of renegotiation, of couse, can induce the ﬁrm to make such
investments. This means that mandatory product liability is strictly superior to contractual-based
liability if making the product safe is necessarily eﬃcient. If, however, the cost of making the
product safe is too high, or the legal system is too costly, then welfare could be greater without
these safety investments but without the costs of legally enforced liability as well. The advantage of
contractually-based liability is that it allows the ﬁr mt ou s ei t si n f o r m a t i o na b o u tt h ec o s to fm a k i n g
the product safer to determine whether such safety investments are eﬃcient. Contractually-based
liabilty avoids the costs of liability when these investments are ineﬃcient, while still making these
investments with some probability (though, not with probability one) when these investments are
eﬃcient.
So, whether mandatory or contractually-based liability is optimal will depend on the probability
that making the product safer is eﬃcient and on the cost of the legal system. Not surprisingly, the
greater the likelihood that the cost of making the product safer is low, the greater the advantage
of mandatory liability. There are, however, two somewhat surprising comparative static results.
These are that both the cost of the legal system and the probability of a safer product causing an
accident actually have a non-monotonic eﬀect on the relative desirability of mandatory liability.
When both of these are very low, increasing each of them actually increases the desirability of
mandatory liability. The reason is that the product of the cost of the legal system and the
probability of a safer product causing an accident gives the expected legal costs when the product
is safer. If these expected legal costs are very low, there is little ex post ineﬃciency associated with
holding the ﬁrm liable. As a result, the maximum probability that the ﬁrm will invest in safety
under contractually-based liabilty is greater, reducing the relative incentive advantage of mandatory
liability over contractually-based liability. As expected legal costs rise, contractually-based liabilty
becomes less eﬀective at inducing the ﬁrm to invest in safety (the maximum probabilty declines),
making mandatory liability relative more advantageous. But, if expected legal costs get too large,
then the transactions costs of mandatory liability start to outweigh the incentive beneﬁts, making
mandatory liability less advantageous.
The next section describes the model, ﬁrst for a constant cost of investing in safety, so that
investing in safety is necessarily eﬃcient, then when there is some probability that investing in
safety is ineﬃcient. The last section concludes. Proofs not contained in the text are in the
Appendix.
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2.1 Constant c
A ﬁrm oﬀers a product to a risk neutral consumer, who values the product a v.T h e ﬁrm can
invest in making the product safer at a cost of c or not.2 All additional production costs are
normalized to zero. If the ﬁrm invests in safety, the probability of an accident is ql,i fi td o e sn o t
the probability is qh; ql <q h. Neither the consumer nor the courts can observe whether the ﬁrm
invested in safety. The harm suﬀered by the consumer if there is an accident is h.I f t h e ﬁrm
is liable, then the consumer and the ﬁrm each spend kc and kf respectively on legal costs if an
accident occurs. Let k = kc + kf be the total legal costs from going to court.
I assume that v>q h(h+k), so the consumer always values the product more than the expected
safety and litigation costs, even if the ﬁrm does not invest in safety. Furthermore, assume that
c<(qh−ql)h; investing in safety is always eﬃcient (I relax this assumption in the next subsection).
Clearly, the ﬁr s tb e s ts o l u t i o ni sf o rt h eﬁrm to invest in safety and for it not to be liable for
damages in the event of an accident. Since investing in safety is unobservable, however, the ﬁrst
best is not achievable. I now consider what happens if the consumer and the ﬁrm are free to write
their own contract. I assume that they contract after the ﬁrm has made the decision of whether
or not to invest in safety. The results would be similar if they could contract before the ﬁrm made
its investment decision as long as they had the opportunity to renegotiate this contract after the
safety decision has been made.
If the parties are allowed to contract out of strict product liability, then the optimal contract
will consist of the following menu. Each contract will specify whether or not the ﬁrm is liable in
the event of an accident and two prices, one for each liability regime.3 Thus, the consumer will
oﬀer the ﬁrm the following menu of contracts is {(pN,N),(pL,L)}. pj is the price for the good
in liability regime j (N for not liable, L for liable). The second element of each pair (N or L)
speciﬁes the liablity regime.4
2I assume that the consumer cannot aﬀe c tt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fa na c c i d e n t . T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tc o n s u m e re ﬀorts
are an important determinant of accident probability, this provides an argument against full producer mandatory
liability, but does not undermine the results in this paper about the limitations of contractually-based liability. See
Priest (1981) for a discussion of the importance of consumer precautions and Cooper and Ross (1985) for a formal
model of warranties with double moral hazard.
3In principle, one could allow for partial liability. But, since I have assumed ﬁxed costs of going to court, partial
liability will never be optimal. Similarly, given that consumers and ﬁrms are risk neutral and consumers cannot
aﬀect the probability of an accident, contracts that specify less than full compensation in the event of an accident
are also suboptimal.
4As discussed in the introduction, the assumption that the consumer make make a contract oﬀer to the ﬁrm is
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Since the safety investment is sunk before the consumer and ﬁrm contract, this implies that a ﬁrm
that invests in safety must have some ex post market power, otherwise it would not be able to
recoup the ﬁxed cost of its investment. A ﬁrm that invests in safety will make zero proﬁts with
either a contract of (c,N) (the price just covers the cost of its investment in safety) or a contract
of (c + ql(h + kf),L) (the price covers the cost of the safety investment and its expected legal
costs).5 A ﬁrm that does not invest in safety will make zero proﬁts with either a contract of (0,N)
or a contract of (qh(h + kf),L). Now consider the legal regime where the default rule is strict
liability but the customer is allowed to oﬀer a no liability contract. Thus, under the default rule
of ﬁrm liability, I assume the ﬁrm has enough market power to sell the good to the consumer for a
price of c + ql(h + kf) as long as the consumer believes the ﬁrm invested in safety.6 Without this
assumption, there is no way to get the ﬁrm to ever invest in safety.
For any given type of ﬁrm, the customer is always better oﬀ with the no liability contract. If
the ﬁrm invests in safety and the contract gives it zero proﬁts, the customer’s expected utility is
v−c−qlh with the no liability contract and is v−c−ql(h+k) with the liability contract. Similarly,
if the ﬁrm does not invest in safety and the contract gives it zero proﬁts, the customer’s expected
utility is v − qhh with the no liability contract and is v − qh(h + k) with the liability contract.
Thus, if the customer can correctly infer the type of ﬁrm, she will always choose to oﬀer the ﬁrm a
no liability contract that gives the ﬁrm the same expected proﬁts it would receive with the default
liability contract. Anticipating this, however, the ﬁrm would never invest in safety.
That is, the only pure strategy equilibrium that exists is where the ﬁrm does not invest in
safety and the consumer oﬀers to waive liability and pay zero rather than qh(h+ kf)f o rt h eg o o d .
Since investing in safety is eﬃcient, however, this equilibrium is inferior to any mixed strategy
equilibrium that may exist. I now check to see that such an equilibrium exists where the ﬁrm
i n v e s t si ns a f e t yw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yπ. In this equilibrium, the consumer will oﬀer the ﬁrm a choice
from the following menu of contracts {(0,N),(c + ql(h + kf),L)}. With this menu, if the ﬁrm
critical. It is not critical that the consumer make the only oﬀer. As long as the consumer can make at least one
oﬀer, the results will remain unchanged (Wickelgren 2003). Given that, ex post (though not ex ante), both parties
are better oﬀ when the consumer makes an oﬀer, it is reasonable to expect this to occur.
5I assume liability equals harm, h. Given the binary nature of safety investment, and that investing in safety is
always eﬃcient, this is one of many optimal liability rules.
6One way to think about this is to say that there are many ﬁrms who enter without investing in safety, but only
a small number who enter and invest in safety. Thus, the safe ﬁrms, if the consumer can indentify them, have some
(ex post) market power. The reason that only a small number of ﬁrms enter and invest in safety is because doing so
is costly. So an individual ﬁrm can only recoup its investment if only a few other ﬁrms enter.
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prefers the no liability contract. The consumer’s utility of oﬀering this menu is:
v − π(c + ql(h + k)) − (1 − π)qhh (1)
The ﬁrm is cleary indiﬀerent between investing in safety or not ex ante since it earns zero ex ante
proﬁts either way. For this to be an equilibrium, the consumer must not want to deviate by
increasing pN to get the ﬁrm that invests in safety to choose the no liability contract. For a safe
ﬁrm to choose the no liability contract, the consumer must oﬀer pN = c.I f i t d o e s s o , h o w e v e r ,
then it must pay c to both the safe and the unsafe ﬁrm. If the probability that the ﬁrm is safe is
π, this gives the consumer an expected utility of:
v − c − πqlh − (1 − π)qhh (2)
Deviating then lowers the consumer’s utility if and only if (2)≤(1), that is if and only if:




This π∗ represents the maximum equilibrium probability of the ﬁr mi n v e s t i n gi ns a f e t yw h e nt h e
law allows the consumer and ﬁrm to contract out of ﬁrm liability. Thus, I have proved the following
propostion.
Proposition 1 If the ﬁrm and the consumer can contract out of product liability, then the proba-
bility that the ﬁrm invests in safety is no greater than c
qlk+c < 1. That is, even if investing
in safety is eﬃcient, the ﬁrm will not invest in safety with probability one if the consumer
and ﬁr ma r ef r e et ow r i t et h e i ro w nc o n t r a c t .
When safety investment is unobservable, and ﬁrms and consumers have the opportunity to
contract after the product has been made, so that any safety investments have already been made,
there is no way to induce the ﬁrm to always make a safe product. Notice that this result is very
similar to Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1990) result an agent cannot be induced to work hard with
probability one if the principal and the agent can renegotiate their contract after the agent has
chosen her eﬀort level. In this model, the consumer is the principal and the ﬁrm is the agent.
Litigation costs play the same role that risk aversion plays in Fudenberg and Tirole’s model: the
6
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eliminates ex ante incentives. The only way to maintain the ﬁrm’s incentives so that it always
i n v e s t si ns a f e t yi sf o rt h eﬁrm and the consumer to be able to commit not to contract out of the
liability rule after the product has been made. Mandatory strict liability provides this commitment
device.
I now evalute the consumer’s utility when she can contract out of mandatory strict liability.
I assume that the ﬁrm invests in safety with the largest possible probability, so I evaluate (1) at
π = π∗.7 Doing so gives the following:




I now compare this to utility where the ﬁrm and the consumer are not allowed to contract out of
product liability. (Since ﬁrm proﬁts are zero in either case, this is also a total welfare comparison.)
In this case, the ﬁrm invests in safety and charges the consumer c + ql(h + kf)f o rt h eg o o d . I f
there is an accident, the consumer has to spend kc to go to court to get the ﬁrm to pay for the
consumer’s harm. Thus, the consumer’s utility is:
v − (c + ql(h + k)) (5)
By subtracting (4) from (5), one can determine the consumer’s gain from mandatory product
liability:
qlk
(qh − ql)h − (qlk + c)
qlk + c
(6)
Thus, I have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Mandatory product liability strictly increases consumer utility and total welfare if
and only if (qh − ql)h>(qlk + c), that is, if and only if the beneﬁts of investing in safety
exceed its costs plus legal costs.
Given that the free entry ensures that the ﬁrm earns zero proﬁts in equilibrium, the more
eﬃc i e n tr u l ew i l la l s ob e n e ﬁt the consumer the most. Thus, it is not surprising that the consumer
beneﬁts from mandatory product liability if and only if the incentive beneﬁts of the rule outweigh
7If the consumer is better oﬀ under mandatory liability when the ﬁr ma l w a y si n v e s t si ns a f e t yt h a nu n d e rc o n -
tractible liability when the ﬁrm invests in safety with probability π
∗,t h e ni tw i l lb eb e t t e ro ﬀ than when the ﬁrm
invests in safety with any smaller probability.
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welfare gain from mandatory product liability varies with the diﬀerent parameters of the model.
Proposition 3 The gain in total welfare from mandatory product liability is (i) decreasing in c (ii)












The ﬁrst three results are exactly what one would expect. The less costly investing in safety
is, the greater the gain from mandatory product liability that induces more investment in safety.
Similarly, the greater the harm from an accident or in the chance of the unsafe product causing
an accident, the more valuable it is to induce the ﬁrm to invest in safety. One might also think
that the smaller the probability of a safe product causing an accident, the more the consumer
would beneﬁt from mandatory product liability. The reason this is not always true is that π∗ (the
maximum probability that the ﬁrm will invest in safety without mandatory liability) is decreasing in
ql.W h e n ql is very small, the ex post ineﬃciency from liability is quite small since the consumer is
very unlikely to have to go to court. This makes deviation to a no liability contract less proﬁtable
for any given π, increasing the maximum feasible π.S o , i f ql is very small, the diﬀerence in
the probability that the ﬁrm invests in safety between mandatory liability and contractual based
liability is quite small, making the advantage of mandatory product liability quite small. Once ql is
large, however, the diﬀerence in the probability that the ﬁrm invests in safety becomes substantial.
At this point, since larger ql makes investing in safety less valuable, it decreases the beneﬁto f
mandatory product liablity. The same reasoning explains the non-monotonic eﬀect of k as well.
When k is small, liability is not very ineﬃcient, so π∗ can be large. But if k gets too large, then the
ex post ineﬃciency of liability starts to signiﬁcantly counteract the incentive beneﬁts of mandatory
liability. Thus, the argument in favor of mandatory liability is strongest for intermediate values of
legal costs.
2.2 Variable c
In the last subsection, the cost of investing in safety was ﬁxed so that investing in safety was always
eﬃcient. While this model is suﬃcient to demonstrate that rational parties cannot necessarily
achieve the eﬃcient outcome when they have freedom to contract, it also assumes away any beneﬁt
from giving parties the ﬂexibility to choose their own liability rule. In this subsection, I assume
8
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rH =1− rL − rM respectively.8 I make the following assumption about the three values of c:
cL < (qh − ql)h − qlk<c M < (qh − ql)(h + k) <c H (7)
Thus, if c ∈ {cM,c H}, then holding the ﬁrm liable is ineﬃcient because the cost of investing in
safety plus the expected legal costs of liability exceed the reduction in the expected harm from
using the product. If c = cM,h o w e v e r ,t h eﬁrm will still invest in safety under mandatory liability
since the cost of investing safety is less than diﬀerence in expected liability plus the diﬀerence in
expected legal costs. For c = cH the ﬁrm will nto invest in safety under either regime. For either of
these values of c, allowing the parties to contract out of ﬁrm liability will be superior to mandatory
product liability.
Because the ﬁrm earns zero proﬁt (due to free entry), when c ∈ {cM,c H} the consumer’s utility
is greater when the ﬁrm does not invest in safety. So, in the best equilibrium for the consumer
(and for total welfare), π = π∗ if c = cL and π =0i fc ∈ {cM,c H}. The consumer’s expected
utility from being able to contract out of product liability is:
rL(v − cL − qhh +
(qh − ql)hcL
qlk + cL
)+( 1− rL)(v − qhh)( 8 )
Simplifying, this becomes:




With mandatory product liability, the ﬁrm will invest in safety if c ∈ {cL,c M},t h ec o s to f
investing in safety is less than the expected beneﬁt of reducing the expected harm and the expected
legal costs. In this regime, the consumer’s expected utility is:
rL[v − (cL + ql(h + k))] + rM[v − (cM + ql(h + k))] + (1 − rL − rM)(v − qh(h + k)) (10)
Simplifying, this becomes:
v − qh(h + k)+( rL + rM)(qh − ql)(h + k) − rLcL − rMcM (11)
8T h ec a s ew h e r ec is a random variable that can take any value between c and c is quite similar and does not yield
any signiﬁcant further insights.
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liability. This diﬀerence is:
rLqlk
qlk + cL
((qh − ql)h − qlk − cL) − rM(cM − (qh − ql)h + qlk) − (1 − rL − rM)qhk (12)
By (7), the ﬁrst term is positive and the next two terms are negative. (The ﬁrst term is exactly
rL∗(6), the social welfare gain when c is low with probability one.) So, not surprisingly, mandatory
product liability is beneﬁts consumers when the cost of investing in safety is very likely to be low
and hurts consumers when there is a large probability that the cost of investing of safety is medium
or large.
The comparative statics with uncertain costs of investing in safety are also very similar to what
they were in the constant c case, as the next proposition indicates.
Proposition 4 The gain in total welfare from mandatory product liability is (i) increasing in rL
and decreasing in rM and rH =1− rL − rM (ii) increasing in h (iii) increasing in qh if and
only if rH < rH (iv) increasing in ql if and only if ql < ql for some ql (v) increasing in k if
k<k for some k.
Proof. See Appendix.
Not surprisingly, the greater the harm from the accident, the more important it is to induce
investment in safety, which mandatory product liability is more eﬀective at doing. A similar
argument explains why larger qh makes the gain from mandatory product liability greater. The
reason this result does not hold for large rH is that when the cost of investing in safety is high,
there is no investment in safety with either mandatory liability or voluntary contracting. The
only diﬀerence is that the customer must pay legal costs with mandatory product liability, whose
expected level are greater the greater the probability of an accident. The reason that the welfare
gain from mandatory product liability is increasing in ql and k when these values are small is
that, as we saw in the prior subsection, these parameters determine the maximum probability
of investing in safety with voluntary contracting. When there is very little probability of an
accident when the ﬁrm invests in safety or if legal costs are very small, expected legal costs from
liability are small. This means that the maximum probability that the ﬁrm will invest in safety
under voluntary liablity can be quite large, mitigating the advantage of mandatory liability. As
these parameters get bigger, the maximum probability the ﬁrm will invest in safety with voluntary
contracting becomes quite small, making the diﬀerence in the incentive eﬀects of the two regimes
10
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incentive advantages of mandatory liability. Once again, the argument for mandatory liability is
greatest with intermediate values of expected legal costs.
3C o n c l u s i o n
This paper demonstrates that the widely held belief that consumers must systematically misperceive
the risks associated with a product for mandatory product liability to be optimal is incorrect if
consumers cannot observe investments in safety. In this model, consumers do rationally infer the
expected accident probability of a product, and, even oﬀer screening contracts to be able to perfectly
distinguish safer products from unsafe products. Nonetheless, under voluntary contracting, there
is no equilibrium where ﬁrms invest in safety with probability one even when doing so is eﬃcient.
Because using the legal system is costly, consumers have an incentive, once safety investments are
sunk, to waive liability and obtain lower prices. To prevent them from doing so, and thereby
completely undermining a ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in safety, the consumer must believe that there
is some minimum probability that the ﬁrm did not invest in safety. The only way to induce the
ﬁrm to invest in safety with probability one is to make liability mandatory. That is, the ineﬃciency
of the legal system creates an argument for making using the legal system mandatory.
While this paper does not show that mandatory product liability is necessarily more eﬃcient
than contractually based liability, it does demonstrate that the simple argument that rational
consumers and ﬁrms can achieve through contract the same eﬃcient outcomes that mandatory
liability can is mistaken. Instead, call for restricting mandatory liability must acknowledge that
there is a real incentive cost to doing so, even if consumers are completely rational. There maybe
situations where the beneﬁts of restricting liability in terms of reduced legal costs outweigh the
loss in incentives for investments in safety, but such a comparison of costs and beneﬁts cannot be
avoided. Contractually-based liability cannot achieve the ﬁrst, or even second, best.
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Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Diﬀerentiating qlk
(qh−ql)h−(qlk+c)
qlk+c with respect to c gives −qlkh
(qh−ql)
(qlk+c)2 <
0. (ii) Diﬀerentiating qlk
(qh−ql)h−(qlk+c)
qlk+c with respect to h gives qlk
(qh−ql)
(qlk+c) > 0. (iii) Diﬀerentiating
qlk
(qh−ql)h−(qlk+c)
qlk+c with respect to qh gives
qlkh
qlk+c > 0. (iv) Diﬀerentiating qlk
(qh−ql)h−(qlk+c)
qlk+c with
respect to ql gives k
ch(qh−ql)−(qlk+c)(c+(h+k)ql)
(qlk+c)2 .T h i s h a s t h e s i g n o f ch(qh−ql)−(qlk+c)(c+(h+k)ql).
Taking the derivative of this with respect to ql gives −2(h+k)(qlk +c) < 0, so ch(qh −ql)−(qlk +







k.( v ) D i ﬀerentiating qlk
(qh−ql)h−(qlk+c)
qlk+c with respect to k gives ql(
ch(qh−ql)
(qlk+c)2 −1).
This has the sign of ch(qh − ql) − (qlk + c)2. Taking the derivative of this with respect to
k gives −2q2
1(qlk + c) < 0, so ch(qh − ql) − (qlk + c)2 is strictly decreasing in k.S o l v i n g
ch(qh − ql) − (qlk + c)2 =0g i v e sk =
√
ch(qh−ql)−c
ql .Q . E . D .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . (i) Write (12) as
rLqlk
qlk+cL((qh − ql)h − qlk − cL) − rM(cM − (qh −
ql)h + qlk) − rHqhk. The ﬁrst term is rL ∗ (6) and we know that (6) > 0. rM only appears in the
second term, which is negative by the deﬁnition of cM. The third term is where rH =1−rL −rM
appears and that is clearly decreasing in rH. (ii) Diﬀerentiating (12) with respect to h gives
(rL+rM)qlk+rMcL
qlk+cL (qh − ql) > 0. (iii) Diﬀerentiating (12) with respect to qh gives rMh − k(1 −
rL − rM −
rLqlh
qlk+cL)=rMh − k(rH −
rLqlh









This has the sign of the numerator. Diﬀerentiating the numeratior with respect to ql gives −2k(h+
k)(qlk + cL)(rL + rM) < 0. So, the numerator is positive only for small ql. Evaluating it at
ql =0g i v e scL(k(qhk − cL)rL − cL(h + k)rM). This is positive if rL is large relative to rM.( v )
Diﬀerentiating (12) with respect to k gives
rLcLh(qh−ql)ql
(qlk+cL)2 − qh(1 −rL −rM) − ql(rL + rM). This is
clearly decreasing in k,s oi fi tw i l le v e rb ep o s i t i v ei tw i l lb ep o s i t i v ef o rs m a l lk.A t k =0 ,i ti s
rLh(qh−ql)ql
cL − qh(1 − rL − rM) − ql(rL + rM). This is positive if rL is large enough; at rL = 1 it is
rLql
cL (h(qh − ql) − cL) > 0. Q.E.D.
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